We develop here the Stochastic Perron Method in the framework of two-player zero-sum differential games. We consider the formulation of the game where both players play, symmetrically, feed-back strategies (as in [CR09] 
Introduction
Continuous time games have been an active research area since the pioneering work of Isaacs [Isa65] . In [EK72] , Elliot and Kalton studied a deterministic differential game, where one player (using strategies) observes continuously the actions of the other players, who plays open loop controls. This formulation of the game has been considered for the first time in stochastic framework in [FS89] . The viscosity solution approach previously used in deterministic setting turns out to be quite involved here, and, actually, one cannot prove the dynamic programming principle working directly with the value functions (see [FS89] or [Kat95] ).
A different approach, resembling verification for classical solutions but in the context of non-smooth viscosity solutions, was employed in [Świ96a] and [Świ96b] (first for deterministic problems and then for zero-sum stochastic games in Elliott-Kalton formulation). There, it was proven (using inf/sup convolution regularization of viscosity solutions in the spirit of [LS85] and an approximation of the state equation by non-degenerate diffusions) that viscosity sub/super-solutions satisfy the corresponding half of the DPP (so called sub/super-optimality conditions), therefore comparing to the value function. The unique continuous viscosity solution (obtained separately by PDE methods, most likely by Perron's method for viscosity solutions introduced in [Ish87] ) is equal to the value function(s) and the DPP is satisfied. In order to regularize the diffusion, the probability space needs to be enlarged to accommodate an independent Brownian Motion. This means that verification is actually performed for a slightly different game, not the one in the original formulation. Similar technical arguments to prove DPP for games in Elliott-Kalton formulation were used very recently in [Kry13a] and [Kry13b] for non-degenerate diffusions, but with only measurable in space coefficients.
Out of the existing literature, most papers (all above) use the Elliott-Kalton formulation, where one player uses controls and the other uses strategies. This asymmetric formulation produces two values of the game that do not compare by definition, as one would expect. It seems more natural to consider a symmetric formulation of the game. One way to do this, is to consider, for both players strategies which are based only on the knowledge of the past of the state. Each player's actions are responses to the other player's actions through the use of such feed-back strategies. This is exactly the case in [CR09] (who consider a game in the strong formulation over feed-back strategies with delay, but even allow for some mixing) or, more recently, in [PZ12] , where pure feed-back strategies (under the name of feed-back controls borrowed from the more classical control literature) are considered. In the weak formulation of a non-Markovian game over feed-back strategies, [PZ12] use BSDE's techniques to conclude that the values of the games are solutions of the path-dependent Isaacs equations. This work follows a long line of interesting results relating BSDEs to stochastic games in Elliott-Kalton formulation: [HL95] , [EKH03] or [BL08] , to name just a few.
We provide here a novel tool to study continuous-time zero-sum stochastic differential games, in an (arguably) more natural formulation. The aim of the current paper is two-fold:
1. to consider a symmetric formulation of the game over a (restricted class of) feed-back strategies that yield strong solutions of the state equations. The restriction is quite different, and, we believe more natural than the delay in [CR09] . We find it conceptually important to have a class of strategies where the state is a one-to-one response to the (unobserved) noise, once both players have decided on what strategies will be used.
2. to show that the Stochastic Perron Method (introduced in [BS12b] for linear problems, later for Dynkin games in [BS12a] and for control problems in [BS13] ) can be adapted to differential games in the above formulation. This amounts to a new method to study games, and actually turns out to be rather elementary compared to existing work.
In order to illustrate our approach, we impose some restrictive conditions on the controlled stochastic system, rather than consider the most general framework. More precisely: the state space is the whole R d , the state equation is uniformly locally Lipschitz in the state variable, the terminal pay-off is bounded, controls live in compact spaces, etc. It is well known from [FS89] that stochastic games are non-trivial even with (more) restrictive assumptions, as the strategic nature of the problem remains intact. We also consider only terminal pay-off, but running cost can be easily added. However, we allow for the state equation to be degenerate, so one cannot expect any smoothness of solutions to the Bellman-Isaacs equation(s).
The method we present here amounts to a verification result for non-smooth viscosity solutions. Stochastic Perron plus viscosity comparison shows that the value function(s) is the unique viscosity solution of the Bellman-Isaacs equation(s) and (a version of) the DPP holds. Aside from the symmetric definition of the game over feed-back strategies, our verification program is conceptually different from the verification arguments in [Świ96a] , [Świ96b] . We work directly with the state equation and the original definition of the game. Our approach does not approximate the state equation by more regular diffusions so we have a verification argument for the original (strong) definition of the game on the initially chosen physical space that does not need to accommodate an additional independent Brownian motion. Technically, the Stochastic Perron construction is rather elementary and is based only on how we define stochastic semi-solutions, the well known definition of viscosity solutions and Itô's Lemma. Our verification is completed by a comparison argument that has to be proved analytically and separately anyway (here and in other existing approaches).
Stochastic Differential Games and Strategies

The Stochastic System
We consider a stochastic differential game with two players. First player's actions belong to a compact metric space (U, d u ) (usually U ⊂ R k ), while second player's action belong also to a compact metric space (V, d v ) (usually V ⊂ R l ). We assume that the state lives in the whole space
′ be two continuous functions. We consider the diffusion
starting at initial time s at position x, and which is controlled by both players. Here, W is a d ′ -dimensional Brownian motion on a fixed probability space (Ω, F, P). We intend to pose the problem in such a way that the state equation will admit strong solutions. Therefore, is is natural to assume that, for the initial time s, the filtration considered is F s = (F s t ) s≤t≤T , the augmented natural filtration generated by the Brownian increments starting at s, by which we mean.
However, any larger filtration that keeps W · − W s a Brownian motion starting at s and satisfying the usual condition is also fine. Now, given a bounded and continuous function g : R d → R, the second player pays, in this game, to the first player, the amount E[g(X s,x;u,v T )]. This leads to a zero-sum game of the form sup
Just for the sake of presentation, we have assumed that no running cost is present, as in [BS13] . Such cost can easily be added. The lower and the upper Hamiltonians are defined by
We associate, formally for the moment, the following Isaacs equations to the game
For i = − we have the lower Isaacs equation, and for i = + we have the upper Isaacs equation. We make the standing assumption that that the coefficients b, σ of the stochastic system are jointly continuous, satisfy a uniform local Lipschitz condition in x, i.e.
for some L(K) < ∞ and also satisfy a global linear growth condition in
Under these assumptions, if both players choose to hold a constant strategy, the controlled state has a unique solution. This holds even if the game is started at a random (but stopping) time sequel to the starting time s, and the constant strategies depend on whatever happened before the starting time. More precisely, we have the following proposition:
be random variables measurable with respect to F s τ ′ . Then, the system starting at time τ ′ with initial condition ξ, where both players choose constant strategies a, b in between τ ′ and T has a (path-wise) unique strong solution. In other words, the SDE
has a unique strong solution (X t ) τ ′ ≤t≤T . If ξ is square integrable, the solution is square integrable as well.
Proof: the arguments are standard, so we omit the details. Path-wise (or strong) uniqueness is proved by localization and Gronwall. Using again localization and then a Piccard iteration, we prove existence of saturated strong solutions, up to some explosion time. The global growth condition and Gronwall insures that there is actually no explosion. ⋄
Elementary Strategies
So far, the game is defined formally. To have a consistent mathematical definition, we need to define non-constant strategies for each player. In our setting, both players play strategies, as, for example, in [CR09] and, more recently, in [PZ12] (where the feed-back strategies are called controls, following the control theoretic literature). This leads to a symmetric formulation of the two values of the game, which compare by definition. Both players observe continuously the state process (which is a response to both players actions) but not the noise. Therefore, strategies should be:
1. functionals of the past of the state (pure feed-back strategies), if one expects the game to have a value. This is the case in [CR09] (with delay) and [PZ12] (for the weak formulation) and follows the well known use of such strategies in control theory (see, for example, the notion of natural strategies in [Kry09])
2. strategies as above, but mixed (at each time), if the game over pure strategies as above does not have a value (some mixing is actually allowed in [CR09] )
With this in mind, we believe that the game should be first formulated over such pure (feed-back) strategies and, if the lower and upper values are not equal, then one should proceed directly to considering mixed strategies where the game is expected to have a value. For mathematical reasons, we treat in the present paper the complete picture of the game over pure strategies, namely, we study separately the two value functions as solutions of the two Isaacs equations. If the Isaacs condition does hold, then, obviously, the game is expected to have a value over pure strategies. We leave the case of elementary mixed strategies and Stochastic Perron to forthcoming work. We do not assume any delay as in [CR09] for two reasons: such strategies don't work well with Stochastic Perron and, conceptually, we find it harder to justify delaying the information available, while, at the same time, continuously changing actions. Some other restriction has still to be imposed on the feed-back strategies, so that, once each player chooses a strategy, the state equation has a unique strong solution. Despite the fact the noise is unobserved, we believe it is conceptually important for the state equation to have a unique strong solution over pure strategies. In addition, our so called Elementary Strategies that we propose below, are exactly the kind of strategies that one can expect to enforce in a continuous-time game, where changing actions continuously may not be completely feasible, but when a change is made, the information available should not be delayed and only used later. Elementary Strategies are defined in a very similar manner to how one defines Elementary Integrands in stochastic integration, but on the state path space.
To simplify notation, for the remainder of the paper, fixed a starting time s, we denote by
and endow this path space with the natural (and raw) filtration
Elements of the path space C([s, T ]) will be, usually, denoted by y(·) or y, when there is no risk of confusion. Stopping times on the space C([s, T ]) with respect with the filtration B s , i.e. mappings τ :
. We denote by B s the class of such stopping rules starting at s. • a finite non-decreasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. τ k ∈ B s for k = 1, . . . , n and
• for each k = 1 . . . n, a constant value of the strategy ξ k in between the times τ k−1 and τ k , which is decided based only on the knowledge of the past state up to
The strategy is to hold
Such a strategy can be denoted, when there is no risk of confusion, also as u = (ξ k , τ k ) k=1,n . An elementary strategy v for the second player is defined in an identical way, but takes values in V . We denote by U (s, s) and V(s, s) the collections of all possible elementary strategies for the first, and the second player, given the initial deterministic time s.
The timings τ k of changing the controls in the definition of strategies, are exactly the "stopping rules" considered in the game of stopping and control in [KS01] . In addition, we would like to point out, that, since ξ 1 ∈ B s s , this means that ξ 1 (·) = l(x(s)), for some measurable function l : R d → U. It is obvious that, for a simple strategy, the representation u = (ξ k , τ k ) k=1,n is not unique.
Remark 2.3
The simple strategies we propose here are obviously non-anticipative functionals of the paths of X but they are neither 1. Lipschitz with respect to the sup norm on the path-space (this allows for great flexibility in pursuing Stochastic Perron)
2. nor delayed strategies as considered in [CR09] Lipschitz functionals of the path are good strategies to define the values of the game (resulting in strong solutions of the state equation, with the very strong additional Lipschitz assumption of coefficients) but hard to fit in the framework of Stochastic Perron we develop here. In addition, we believe that our "discrete-time" strategies are easier to justify in applications.
Fortunately, the strategies we just defined still produce strong solutions of the state equation without any Lipschitz assumption in u, v. More precisely, iterating Proposition 2.1, we get Proposition 2.4 Fix s, x and let players one and two choose strategies u ∈ U (s, s) and v ∈ V(s, s).
Then, there exists a unique strong (and square integrable) solution (X s,x;u,v t ) s≤t≤T of the state equation
Uniquness holds in the path-wise sense.
The proof of the above proposition is based on iterating Proposition 2.1 together with the following very simple but useful lemma:
Lemma 2.5 Fix s and let τ a stopping rule, τ :
s≤t≤T be a process with continuous (all, not only almost surely) paths, which is adapted to F s . Then, the random time [FS89] , where one player chooses open-loop controls and the other strategies, again, existence of strong solutions of the state equation is easily checked. Once feed-back strategies are allowed (actually for both players), the existence of strong solutions is non-trivial. One can, therefore, either restrict strategies, as in [CR09] in order to have a strong formulation, or consider a weak formulation as in [PZ12] (but restriction are needed even in the weak formulation). We choose here the strong formulation, and restrict the strategies to the class of elementary strategies.
We now formulate the game rigorously. For fixed 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ R d (deterministic), we define the lower and the upper value of the game
Since both our players play strategies (symmetrically), the lower and the upper value compare by definition. This feature has already been emphasized in the literature, like [CR09] or [PZ12] , in opposition to the Elliott-Kalton formulation in [FS89] . A finite valued version of feed-back strategies is present in [PZ12] for technical reasons, but the discretization is over deterministic times, and the game is in weak formulation. Our strategies are actually not finite valued, they are discrete only in time. Discretization over deterministic times is also reminiscent of the classic work [Nis88] , where the author uses a fixed time grid and then passes to the limit using semi-group techniques.
The lower value has the meaning that player 1, announces his/her full strategy to player 2, who chooses a strategy accordingly. Symmetrically for the upper value. Of course, something like this does not really happen, so if the two values differ one should just consider mixed strategies. However, we do analyze the two possibly different values for mathematical reasons. Assume for a moment, that, player 2, indeed, knows the full strategy that player 1 is going to use. If that is the case, since both players' strategies are non-anticipative functionals of the path, conceptually, this would correspond exactly to the Elliott-Kalton idea that player 2 observes continuously player's 1 controls. It is, therefore, not surprising that we expect such lower value and upper value, to be the solutions to the corresponding Isaacs equation. However, such a heuristic statement needs a proof, and part of our contribution is to provide such proof.
We also need need to define strategies starting at sequel times to the initial (deterministic) time s. The starting time is a stopping rule. Definition 2.7 (Elementary Strategies starting later) Fix s and let τ ∈ B s be a stopping rule. An elementary strategy, denoted by u ∈ U (s, τ ), for the first player, starting at τ , is defined by
• (again) a finite non-decreasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. τ k ∈ B s , k = 1, . . . n for some finite n, and with τ = τ 0 ≤ . . . τ k ≤ · · · ≤ τ n = T.
• for each k = 1 . . . n, a constant action ξ k in between the times τ k−1 and τ k , which is decided based only on the knowledge of the past state up
The
We define similarly V(s, τ ) for the second player.
It is clear that, if we consider τ = s in Definition 2.7 of U (s, τ ), we obtain the same thing as U (s, s) in Definition 2.2, so the notation is consistent. The same for V. The classes of strategies U (s, τ ) and V(s, τ ) are, obviously, not closed in any reasonable sense, but they are very robust classes. The two results below have very simple proofs, which we omit.
Lemma
is a simple strategy starting at s, i.e. u ⊗ τũ ∈ U (s, s). A similar statement holds for the second player.
Stochastic Perron's Method
Having defined elementary strategies, and the concatenation, we are now in position to define stochastic semi-solutions of the two Isaacs equations. strategyṽ ∈ V(s, τ ) such that, for any u ∈ U (s, s) any v ∈ V(s, s), any x ∈ R d and each stopping rule ρ ∈ B s , τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with the simplifying notation X X s,x,u,v⊗τṽ and (see Lemma 2.5)
Choosing τ = s, we can see that, if w is a stochastic super-solution, there existsṽ ∈ V(s, s) such that
for all u ∈ U (s, s) and ρ ∈ B s . After taking the expectation, it is now obvious that, if w is a stochastic super-solution, then we have the half DPP for w, i.e.
Since w(T, ·) ≥ g(·), we obtain easily that w(s, x) ≥ V + (s, x). Compared to the Elliott-Kalton formulation prevalent in the literature, we have here a game where both players use elementary feed-back strategies. Also, in (5), stopping rules are considered instead of stopping times. Therefore, even if one tried to enlarge the probability space to accommodate an independent Brownian motion, it is not clear if the non-trivial approximation arguments in [Świ96b] could be reproduced to conclude that the super-optimality principle (5) is equivalent to the notion of viscosity super-solution of upper Isaacs equation. However, instead of following this direction, we circumvent most difficulties using the more elementary Stochastic Perron Method, which means taking the infimum of stochastic super-solutions. Stochastic sub-solutions of the lower Isaacs equation are defined symmetrically, in an obvious way. 2. for each s and for each stopping rule τ ∈ B s there exists an elementary strategyũ ∈ U (s, τ ) such that, for any u ∈ U (s, s) any v ∈ V(s, s), any x and each stopping rule ρ ∈ B s , τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with the simplifying notation X X s,x,u⊗τũ,v and τ ′ τ (X), ρ ′ ρ(X), we have
It is another easy observation that, a stochastic sub-solution of the lower Isaacs equation satisfies w ≤ V − and the corresponding half DPP/sub-optimality principle. The two definitions above are perfectly symmetric, and they would be enough to proceed with Stochastic Perron, in case the Isaacs condition holds. For the general case we study here we need to also define: there exists an elementary strategyũ ∈ U (s, τ ) (depending on v and τ ) such that, for any u ∈ U (s, s) and any x as well as each stopping rule ρ ∈ B s , τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with the simplifying notation X X s,x,u⊗τũ,v and τ ′ τ (X), ρ ′ ρ(X), we have
We omit the definition of Stochastic super-solution of lower Issacs for reason of being obvious by now. Let w a stochastic sub-solution of upper Isaacs. Fix v ∈ V(s, s) and τ = s. There existsŨ ∈ U (s, s) (depending on v) such that, for each ρ ∈ B s we have
After taking the expectation, it is now obvious that, if w is a stochastic super-solution, then we have the half DPP/sub-optimality principle for w, i.e.
Since w(T, ·) ≤ g(·), we obtain easily that w(s, x) ≤ V + (s, x).
Remark 3.4
The definitions of stochastic semi-solutions are quite different from those in the case of one player (control problems) in [BS13] . There, one simply starts the problem at a stopping time sequel to s in the definition(s): the same does not make sense here. Therefore, the nearly optimal strategy (maybe depending on the other player strategy, as for the sub-solution of upper Isaacs) in the definition(s) has to be concatenated with any other strategy up to that stopping time rule τ . This makes sense conceptually as one cannot simply start the game at τ . On the other hand, if we tried to start the game at a stopping time τ ′ of the original filtration F s , we would get into significant difficulty trying to complete Stochastic Perron's method below. In some sense, this is one of the best features of Stochastic Perron's Method, as it allows for great flexibility as to what we can choose for stochastic semi-solutions, as long as the definitions imply easy comparison to the value function(s).
We denote by 1. U + the set of stochastic super-solutions of upper Isaacs 2. U − the set of stochastic sub-solutions of upper Isaacs 3. L + the set of stochastic super-solutions of lower Isaacs (not defined explicitly) 4. L − the set of stochastic sub-solutions of lower Isaacs.
Since g is bounded, all the sets are obviously non-empty. As expected, by Stochastic Perron's Method we mean taking the sup of sub-solutions and/or inf of super-solutions (by which we mean stochastic semi-solutions):
v
We can say, without need for any more proof, that w − ≤ V − ≤ V + ≤ v + . We recall the standing assumptions: g is continuous and bounded, b and σ are continuous on their whole corresponding domains, locally uniformly Lipschitz in x and have global linear growth in x. The following is the main result In order to prove the Theorem, we need two Lemmas.
Fix τ ∈ B s a stopping time strategy and. Letṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ∈ V(s, τ ) be the two strategies, for the second player, starting at τ corresponding the the super-solutions w 1 and w 2 . The new strategy starting at τ defined bỹ v(t, y(·)) =ṽ 1 (t, y(·)) 1 {w 1 (τ (y),y(τ (y)))≤w 2 (τ (y),y(τ (y)))} +ṽ 2 (t, y(·)) 1 {w 1 (τ (y),y(τ (y)))>w 2 (τ (y),y(τ (y)))} does the job for the definition of w w 1 ∧ w 2 as a stochastic super-solution of the upper Isaacs. A similar construction has to be made for the second part. ⋄ Lemma 3.7 There exists a non-increasing sequence U + ∋ w n ց v + and an non-decreasing sequence
Proof: according to Proposition 4.1 in [BS12b] , there existw n ∈ U + such that v + = inf nwn . Now, we can just define w n =w 1 ∧ · · · ∧w n ∈ U + ց v + . A very similar proof works for the second part of the lemma. ⋄ Proof of Theorem 3.5: the proof of the half DPP is obvious, by construction, since we have seen that the stochastic semi-solution satisfy such half DPP. As far as the viscosity property is concerned, we only prove item 1, as the second is obviously symmetric. 1. ( v + is viscosity sub-solution of upper Isaacs) 1.1: The interior sub-solution property for v + : Let (t 0 , x 0 ) in the parabolic interior [0, T ) × R d such that a smooth function ϕ strictly touches v + from above at (t 0 , x 0 ). Assume, by contradiction, that
In particular, there existsv ∈ V and ε > 0 such that
To simplify notation, all small balls here are actually included in the parabolic interior. Since b, σ are continuous, and U is compact, uniform continuity of the above expression in (t, x, u) for (t, x) around (t 0 , x 0 ) implies that there exists a smaller ε > 0 such that
Now, on the compact (rectangular) torus T = B(t 0 , x 0 , ε) − B(t 0 , x 0 , ε/2) we have that ϕ > v + and the min of ϕ − v + is attained, therefore strictly positive. In other words ϕ > v + + η on T for some η > 0. Since w n ց v + , a Dini type argument similar to [BS12a] and [BS13] shows that, for n large enough we have ϕ > w n + η/2. For simplicity, fix such an n and call w = w n . Now, define, for small δ << η/2
Since w δ (t 0 , x 0 ) < v + (t 0 , x 0 ), we obtain a contradiction if we can show w δ ∈ U + . In order to do so, fix s and let τ ∈ B s be a stopping rule for the initial time s. We need to construct an elementary strategyṽ ∈ V(s, τ ) in the Definition of stochastic super-solution for w δ . This can be done as follows: since w is a stochastic super-solution of upper Isaacs, there exists an elementary strategyṽ 1 for w starting at τ that does the job. Then 1. if (ϕ − δ) < w at τ , follow the constant actionv.
2. if (ϕ − δ) ≥ w at (τ, ξ) follow the strategyṽ 1 3. follow the strategy defined in 1-2 until the first time τ 1 when (t, X t ) ∈ ∂B(t 0 , x 0 , ε/2). On this boundary, we know that w δ = w.
4. after this, follow the strategyṽ 3 ∈ V(s, τ 1 ) corresponding to the stochastic sub-solution w with starting stopping rule τ 1
In a rigorous notation though, we first defineṽ 2 ∈ V(s, τ ) bỹ
,y(τ (y)))−δ<w(τ (y),y(τ (y)))} +ṽ 1 (t, y(·)) 1 {ϕ(τ (y),y(τ (y)))−δ≥w(τ (y),y(τ (y)))} .
Now, ifṽ 3 ∈ V(s, τ 1 ) is the strategy from the definition of the stochastic super-solution w, corresponding to stopping rule τ 1 , then we can definẽ
to finish the proof. In order to check thatṽ fulfills the condition in the definition of stochastic supersolution for upper Isaacs, one has to follow similar arguments to the proofs in [BS13] , based on Itô's Lemma applied to d(ϕ − δ)(t, X t ), conditioning and the tower property. However, one has to shift attention from stopping times as in [BS13] to stopping rules. We present the arguments in what follows. Fix u ∈ U (s, s) , v ∈ V(s, s), x ∈ R d and choose a stopping rule ρ ∈ B s with τ ≤ ρ ≤ T . Denote by X X s,x,u,v⊗τṽ , whereṽ was just defined above and
On A, the process (ϕ − δ)(·, X · ) then satisfies the super-martingale property in between τ ′ and τ ′ 1 from Itô's Lemma. On A c , the process w(·, X · ) satisfies the super-martingale inequality in between τ ′ and τ ′ 1 from the definition of the strategyṽ 1 ∈ V(s, τ ). Putting this together, we have
Now, using the fact thatṽ 3 ∈ V(s, τ 1 ) provides a super-martingale inequality concatenated with any previous strategy v and against any strategy u of the opponent, we have
The iterating conditioning provides
s. This means w δ ∈ U + , so we reached a contradiction.
1.2. The terminal condition property for v + : the proof is quite similar to the proof of 1.1. More precisely, first we argue by contradiction, similar to either above or to [BS13] (but easier since controls are compact), then we construct a strategyṽ as above. Finally, we follow the arguments above based on Itô's Lemma and conditioning, to finish the proof. We develop these ideas below.
Assume that, for some
Now v + is USC so bounded on T. Choose η > 0 small enough so that
Since the inequality above is strict, we use again a decreasing sequence and a Dini argument from [BS12a] to find some w ∈ V + such that
We now define, for k > 0 the following function
Since U , V are compact and b, σ are continuous, for some k large enough (but no smaller than ε/2η),
. From (7) we obtain ϕ ε,η,k ≥ ε + w on T. Also,
We now choose δ < ε and define
w outside B(T, x 0 , ε).
Using again the ideas in part 1.1 of the proof, we can show that v ε,η,k,δ ∈ U + but v ε,η,k,δ (T,
v − is viscosity super-solution of upper Isaacs 2. 1. The interior super-solution property for v − : Let (t 0 , x 0 ) interior such that a smooth function ϕ strictly touches v − from below at (t 0 , x 0 ). Assume, by contradiction, that ϕ t + H + (t, x, ϕ x , ϕ xx ) > 0 at (t 0 , x 0 ). There exists a ε > 0 and there exists a measurable function h : V → U, such that
is continuous in (t, x, u, v) and U, V are compact, it is therefore uniformly continuous on C × U × V , where C is any compact neighborhood of (t 0 , x 0 ). Therefore, we can choose a smaller ε > 0 such that (despite the fact that g is only measurable, and maybe not continuous)
On the compact torus T = B(t 0 , x 0 , ε) − B(t 0 , x 0 , ε/2) we have that ϕ < v − and the max of ϕ − v − is attained, therefore strictly negative. In other words ϕ + η < v − on T for some η > 0. Since we can construct an increasing sequence of stochastic sub-solutions w n ր v − , the same Dini type argument similar to [BS12a] and [BS13] shows that, for n large enough we have ϕ + η/2 < w n on T. For simplicity, fix such an n and call w = w n . Now, define, for small δ << η/2
Since w δ (t 0 , x 0 ) > v + (t 0 , x 0 ), we obtain a contradiction if we can show w δ ∈ U − . In order to do so, fix s and let τ : C([s, T ]) → [s, T ] be a stopping time strategy for the initial time s. Fix also v ∈ V(s, s). We need to construct an elementary strategyũ ∈ U (s, τ ) in the Definition of stochastic sub-solutions for w δ , depending on the v we just fixed. This can be again done as follows: since w is a stochastic sub-solution of upper Isaacs, there exists an elementary strategyũ 1 for w starting at τ and depending on v that does the job. Then 1. if ϕ + δ > w at τ , follow the constant action g(v).
2. if w ≥ ϕ + δ at τ follow the strategyũ 1 3. follow the strategy in 1-2 until the first time τ 1 when (t, X t ) ∈ ∂B(t 0 , x 0 , ε/2). On this boundary, w δ = w 4. after this, follow the strategyũ 3 ∈ U (s, τ 1 ) corresponding to the stochastic sub-solution w with starting stopping rule τ 1 and second player's strategy v ∈ V(s, s).
In a rigorous notation though, we first defineũ 2 ∈ U (s, τ ) bỹ
,y(τ (y)))+δ>w(τ (y),y(τ (y)))} +ũ 1 (t, y(·)) 1 {ϕ(τ (y),y(τ (y)))+δ≤w(τ (y),y(τ (y)))} .
The key observation here, is that, since h simply maps V into U , then, indeed,ũ 2 is an elementary strategyũ 2 ∈ U (s, τ ). Denote now by
Now, ifũ 3 ∈ U (s, τ 1 ) is the strategy defining the stochastic super-solution w, corresponding to v ∈ V(s, s) then we can defineũ =ũ 2 ⊗ τ 1ũ 3 ∈ U (s, τ )
to finish the proof. To actually check thatũ (depending on v and τ ) fulfills the condition in the definition of stochastic sub-solution for upper Isaacs, one has to follow similar arguments to the above part 1.1 of the proof, based on Itô's Lemma applied to d(ϕ + δ)(t, X t ), together with conditioning. 2.2. The terminal condition property for v − : the proof is similar to the part 2.1 of the proof, but with an analytic construction very similar to the terminal condition part 1.2. More precisely, first we argue by contradiction, similar to the above step 1.2, then we construct a strategyũ as in 2.1 above depending on the fixed v and τ . Finally, we once again use on Itô's Lemma and conditioning in a similar manner to finish the proof. We note that the DPP is a statement about stopping time rules ρ ∈ B s and is not formulated with respect to stopping times ρ ′ on the original probability space (Ω, F, F s , P).
Verification by Comparison and Dynamic Programming Principle
Remark 4.2 In case the Isaacs condition holds, then one only needs to prove half of the Theorem 3.5 (and arguably the easier one), namely that v + is a viscosity sub-solution of the Isaacs equation and that w − is a super-solution of the very same equation. These statements are perfectly symmetric (and this is the reason why we skipped completely the proof for w + and w − ). In this case, we already have that w − ≤ V − ≤ V + − ≤ v + and the comparison argument closes the proof (including the DPP).
Proof: the (DPP) is an easy conclusion of the way we defined v + , v − , w + and w − , since the stochastic sub/super-solutions of upper/lower Isaacs satisfy the corresponding half DPP. In light of Theorem 3.5, there is basically nothing left to prove, once a comparison result for bounded semicontinuous viscosity solutions of the two Isaacs equations is available. We make it available below to conclude ⋄
The following Lemma below is basically borrowed from the analysis literature. One can either take it from [CIL92] (with modifications to allow for unbounded domains and semi-continuous solutions) or, directly (up to details) from [Pha09] . 
we have L u,v (t, y, α(x − y), Y ) − L u,v (t, x, α(x − y), X) ≤ ω R (α|x − y| 2 + |x − y|), ∀ t, u, v and |x|, |y| ≤ R (9) with the notation L u,v (t, x, p, M ) −b(t, x, u, v) · p − the noise. The technical parts of the proofs (which are basically elementary) are reminiscent of the previous proofs in [BS12b] , [BS12a] and especially [BS13] , and, for the analytic constructions, resemble the classic work of Ishii [Ish87] . An important part of the contribution resides in the symmetric formulation of the game over elementary strategies (and strong solutions of the state equation) and in the proper (non-trivial) identification of stochastic semi-solutions to the Isaacs equations, that allows for the Stochastic Perron's Method to be completed. With this in mind, we reiterate the conjecture that any stochastic optimization problem could be treated using Stochastic Perron's Method, provided that it is properly formulated, and the stochastic semi-solutions defined accordingly.
